Definition
Competition law universally prohibits unilateral abusive market practices by enterprises wielding market power amounting to dominance. Under the Indian competition regime, Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 (“Competition Act”) proscribes the abuse of dominant (“AoD”) position by an enterprise or a group in India. The Competition Act does not provide a market share threshold for establishing dominance but instead sets out several factors such as the size and resources of the parties, the extent of vertical integration, dependence of consumers on the enterprise, and market structure. In principle, dominance requires that an enterprise or group has the ability to act independent of competitors and market forces to affect competition or consumers.
Indian competition law does not recognise the concept of collective dominance.
While the general prohibition against AoD is enshrined under Section 4(1) of the Competition Act, Section 4(2) of the Competition Act enumerates the specific forms of abusive conduct:
imposition of unfair or discriminatory condition(s) or price(s) in the purchase or sale of goods or services;
limiting or restricting production/ supply in the market or technical/ scientific development of the goods and services in the market;
denial of market access in any manner;
making contracts subject to supplementary obligations that are unrelated to the subject of the contract; and
leveraging dominance in one market to enter, maintain or strengthen its position in another market.
A literal reading of the statutory provision suggests that the aforementioned types of abusive conduct are proscriptive in nature (i.e., without requiring the Competition Commission of India (“CCI”) to assess the effects of the conduct on competition). The appellate authorities, however, have interpreted the provision in a manner that makes an evidence‑based effects analysis mandatory for the CCI to establish a contravention of Section 4 of the Act (discussed below).
Commentary
In competition law, dominant enterprises are considered to have a ‘special responsibility’ to not engage in any conduct which may distort competition in the market, and violating the same is likely to be viewed as prohibited as an abuse under Section 4 of the Competition Act.
Even though there is no bright-line test, all forms of abusive conduct are generally categorised as falling under two types, i.e., exploitative conduct or exclusionary conduct. Exploitative conduct is directed at unfairly appropriating value/ monetary and non-monetary benefits from market participants and customers (for instance, imposition of unfair or discriminatory price or condition). On the other hand, exclusionary conduct aims at foreclosing competitive access to the market or raising the competitors’ costs/ making it unsustainable for them to sustain in a commercially viable manner in the market, effectively, insulating the dominant enterprise from competitive forces of the market (e.g., denial of market access and leveraging).
Evolution of AoD Jurisprudence in India
As mentioned above, the CCI’s assessment of AoD has significantly evolved over time. In earlier cases (such as the DLF case1, and the BCCI Case2) the CCI’s assessment generally centred around establishing dominance of the enterprise and assessing the alleged conduct to fall in either the exclusionary or the exploitative bucket without any assessment or discussion of effects. In recent times, the CCI, on an ad-hoc basis, analysed the effects of the alleged abusive practices while finding a contravention (for e.g., in the MMT-OYO Case3). This practice, however, has been re-enforced as a mandatory requirement in a series of judgments of appellate authorities.
In 2023, the NCLAT (in its judgment in appeal of the CCI’s Google Android Order) mandated the CCI to conduct a case-specific assessment of the competitive harm, in terms of, (i) foreclosure of existing or potential competitors, (ii) reinforcement of entry barriers, (iii) long‑term harm to consumer choice and innovation, and (iv) other forms of distortion of competitive dynamics. Since the Google decisions, the CCI has started to delve into assessment of actual or likely effects while establishing AoD (for e.g., in the WhatsApp Case4). Separately, when parties challenged whether demonstrating only likely effects could be sufficient to establish a contravention, NCLAT affirmed that effects-analysis could include both actual and likely effects. This position has been crystallised in 2025, by the Supreme Court, in its landmark judgment in the Schott Glass Case5 by its finding that the CCI shall mandatorily conduct an evidence-based effects analysis to establish AoD.
AoD enforcement trends in India
The CCI has been proactively investigating AoD practices across digital markets enterprises such as online platforms, intermediaries and aggregators for abusive conduct generally considered prevalent in the sector (for e.g., tying of core and ancillary services, discriminatory platform rules impacting dependent business users,6 imposition of a ‘take-it or leave-it’ policy and exploitation of data through cross-utilisation across connected ecosystems,7 self‑preferencing, exclusive commercial arrangements involving price and non-price parity clauses,8 deep discounting, exclusive launches and preferential listing practices on online marketplaces9). Another unique feature of AoD enforcement in India has been investigation of anti-competitive conduct of statutory monopolies and public sector enterprises such as Coal India, State Excise Departments etc. This trend underscores equality in application of competition laws to private and public sector enterprises in India.
Belaire Owners’ Association v DLF Limited and Anr., 2011 SCC OnLine CCI 89.↩︎
Surinder Singh Barmi v Board for Control of Cricket in India, [2013] 113 CLA 579 (CCI).↩︎
In Re: Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Associations of India v. MakeMyTrip Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., 2022 SCC OnLine CCI 58.↩︎
In Re: Updated Terms of Service and Privacy Policy for WhatsApp users, MANU/CO/0036/2024.↩︎
CCI v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1097.↩︎
Umar Javeed v. Google LLC. & Ors., 2022 SCC OnLine CCI 52.↩︎
In Re: Updated Terms of Service and Privacy Policy for WhatsApp users, MANU/CO/0036/2024.↩︎
In Re: Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Associations of India v. MakeMyTrip Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., 2022 SCC OnLine CCI 58.↩︎
In Re: Delhi Vyapar Mahasangh v. Flipkart Internet Private Limited and its affiliated entities & Anr (Case No. 40 of 2019). Order under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act, 2002 dated 13 January 2020.↩︎
