Dominant Position

By Shruti Aji Murali

1. Definition

The Competition Act, 2002 (Act) prohibits the abuse of a dominant position by any enterprise under Section 4. “Dominant position” is defined in the explanation to Section 4 as follows:

“‘Dominant position’ means a position of strength, enjoyed by an enterprise, in the relevant market, in India, which enables it to — (i) operate independently of competitive forces prevailing in the relevant market; or (ii) affect its competitors or consumers or the relevant market in its favour.”

Some aspects of the statutory definition are worth highlighting, and are explored in more detail in the following section:

• Dominance is relational, i.e. a large firm in contestable market is not dominant; a smaller firm insulated from rivalry may be.

• Dominance is also defined within a specific relevant market. The Competition Commission of India’s (CCI) analytical framework for assessing dominance begins with market definition. The final finding on whether an enterprise has infringed Section 4 of the Act depends on the definition of the relevant market, most evident in the aftermarket and systems-market cases.

• Dominance is assessed based on a holistic analysis of multiple factors, listed in Section 19(4) of the Act. There is no bright-line test such as a market share threshold to determine dominance. The CCI’s practice reveals a hierarchy among the factors, with the market share, presence of competitors and achieving monopolies through statutory or regulatory means being considered more often than others.

2. Commentary

The CCI’s case law offers useful insights into how dominant position is defined in practice, and its impact on the CCI’s enforcement of abusive conduct in Indian markets.

1. Dominance as a threshold determination

Conceptually and as reflected in the statute, a dominant position is situated in a particular relevant market. However, the CCI frequently relies on the inverse, i.e. the lack of dominance to close proceedings under Section 26(2) of the Act. This is because an entity cannot abuse its dominant position, if it is not dominant in the first place.

The CCI has closed several cases, based on the fact that the material on record (presented by the informant) or information in the public domain appears to indicate that the opposite party (i.e., the party alleged to be abusing its dominance) does not have market power. The CCI does not always define a specific relevant market if there is sufficient material (such as industry reports) indicating that the opposite party is a small player, with a minuscule market share. In other cases, the CCI may define a relevant market and reach the same conclusion based on materials either presented by the informant or in the public domain.¹ The prima facie lack of dominance, therefore, is an important threshold question the CCI uses to determine whether or not to initiate an inquiry.

2. The role of market definition

Because dominance exists only “in the relevant market,” market definition is analytically prior to the dominance assessment. In practice, market definition is the principal battleground in abuse of dominance inquiry, since an enterprise can be dominant on a narrow definition, but may not if the market is defined broadly.

Under the Act, the relevant market has two dimensions – the relevant product market and the relevant geographic market.² Notably, the 2023 amendments to the Act widened the CCI’s traditional focus on demand-side factors to explicitly consider interchangeability from the perspective of supply-side factors as well. Explicitly incorporating supply-side substitutability factors ensures that the CCI’s analysis is more holistic and grounded in commercial realities.

While the statutory framework is robust, a review of CCI cases indicates a gap between principle and practice. Although the CCI recognises that the crux of market definition lies in identifying the site of contestability, there is rarely robust economic or empirical evidence underpinning the CCI’s relevant market definition.

1. Aftermarkets and systems markets

This deficiency is evident when considering the CCI’s analysis of the aftermarket theory and the consequent assessment of dominance. In these cases, the boundary between a single “systems market” and a narrow brand- or supplier-specific “aftermarket” impacts the outcome of the entire case. It effectively turns the question of dominance into a binary.

The aftermarkets analysis plays out in sectors where consumers purchase a primary product (e.g. a printer), and subsequently need to purchase additional, secondary products or services to use or maintain the primary product (e.g. printer ink cartridges). An alternative theory is that the primary and ancillary products or services are all part of a unified “systems market”, where the consumers’ purchasing decision relates to the purchase of the entire bundle of products and services.

A secondary market is a genuine, separate aftermarket where: (a) “whole-life costing” is not feasible, i.e. consumers cannot accurately assess and compare total long-term maintenance costs before or at the time of buying the primary product or services; (b) “reputation effects” do not constrain competition in the primary market, i.e. that the threat of lost primary-market sales does not deter the supplier from engaging in anti-competitive conduct in the secondary market; and (c) switching costs in the primary market are prohibitive, i.e. consumers cannot abandon the primary product for a rival without incurring a substantial financial loss. Where these factors are evident in a sector, customers may be locked in (through contractual terms, product design, sunk costs or information gaps), thus conferring market power over captive customers in the secondary market, irrespective of the extent of competition in the primary market.

The CCI applied the aftermarkets doctrine in Shamsher Kataria.³ The CCI found fourteen car manufacturers dominant in the aftermarkets for their own-brand spare parts and repair services, regardless of their position in the primary market for passenger vehicles. The CCI found that the 3 aftermarket conditions were met, leading to a finding of dominance in the narrow aftermarket even on a low primary-market share. As a result, a manufacturer with, say, single-digit shares in the primary market for passenger cars could still be found dominant over its own captive parts customers.⁴

In contrast, the CCI rejected the aftermarkets theory in favour of a unified systems market in Vivek Sharma v Max Super Speciality Hospital (2026), finding no infringement and ultimately closing proceedings.⁵ The CCI’s inquiry considered whether 12 super speciality hospitals in Delhi NCR were over-charging admitted patients for medicines, consumables, diagnostics and room rent. Here, the DG considered patients “locked-in” to each hospital’s ecosystem once they are admitted — a classic aftermarket. The CCI disagreed, applying the Shamsher Kataria test to elective in-patient care, but reaching the opposite conclusion. It noted that elective patients receive a detailed cost estimate before admission, final bills do not vary significantly from it, and patients can therefore undertake whole-life costing, i.e. compare between hospitals before committing. It is also considered that switching costs were not prohibitive, the relevant question is not whether a patient is tied to in-house pharmacy and labs once admitted, but whether they can switch hospitals before admission and despite friction, the CCI held they can. On reputational effects, however, the CCI accepted that well-established hospitals with sought-after doctors do not face credible competition on the pricing of in-patient consumables, i.e. the secondary market. Weighing these, the CCI clubbed the primary and secondary markets into a unified “systems market” for the “provision of healthcare services by super speciality hospitals in Delhi[-NCR].” Since none of the hospitals under inquiry could be found dominant within this relevant market, it concluded that no case of abuse of dominance under section 4 was made out.⁶ Critically, the CCI preserved the aftermarkets doctrine with an express reservation - a legally distinct aftermarket may still arise in “limited situations… like post-surgical stay,” where the switching cost for patients “outweigh[s] the cost of continuing treatment at the same hospital” and the patient can neither compare costs in advance nor realistically move. The outcome, therefore, turned on the facts of elective admission; a different factual matrix would yield dominance.

This framework illustrates the impact of a switch in market definition that can establish or dissolve dominance. Additionally, it highlights the importance of granular evidence and careful step-by-step analysis in deciding the outcomes of abuse of dominance inquiries.

3. Collective dominance not recognised

Unlike other jurisdictions,⁷ the Act does not recognise the concept of “collective” dominance.

The CCI has rejected allegations of collective dominance based on the fact that the statutory definition uses “an enterprise”. In Consumer Online Foundation,⁸ the CCI clarified that “the concept of dominance does centre on the fact of considerable market power that can be exercised only by a single enterprise or a small set of market players. Every single player in any relevant market cannot be said to possess such dominance…”. This principle was reiterated in Fast Track Call Cab, where the CCI noted that the Act contemplates only one dominant enterprise “unless it forms part of the same group.”⁹

In 2019, the Competition Law Review Committee (CLRC) rejected the proposal to amend the Act to include collective dominance. The CLRC noted that nearly all cases relating to collective dominance arose from anti-competitive agreements, which are already covered under Section 3 of the Act. It also noted that provisions relating to collective dominance are rarely used.¹⁰

4. Dominant position is relational and based on a factual assessment

The CCI’s definition of dominant position refers to a “position of strength”, directing attention to the enterprise’s capability, rather than absolute scale. The CCI articulated this in HT Media,¹¹ noting that a position of strength “is not some objective attribute that can be measured along a prescribed mathematical index or equation,” but requires “a rational consideration of relevant facts, holistic interpretation of statistics or information.”

As noted above, once a relevant market is defined, Section 19(4) directs the CCI to have “due regard to all or any” of thirteen factors: (a) market share; (b) size and resources; (c) size and importance of competitors; (d) economic power, including commercial advantages; (e) vertical integration; (f) dependence of consumers; (g) monopoly or dominant position acquired by statute or by being a government company/PSU or otherwise; (h) entry barriers; (i) countervailing buyer power; (j) market structure and size of market; (k) social obligations and social costs; (l) relative advantage by contribution to economic development; and (m) any other relevant factor.¹²

This list is not exhaustive, leaving room for the CCI to consider market-specific factors and novel economic effects, such as in digital markets.¹³ The CCI also considered factors outside the strict confines of the relevant market to come to a finding of dominance against DLF Limited, noting that these factors contributed to its ability to operate independently of competitive forces in the relevant market or affect competitors, consumers or the relevant market in its favour.¹⁴

Additionally, the words “all or any” make the list permissive, i.e. that the CCI may come to a finding of dominance based on a subset of these factors. The CCI’s decisional practice indicates that it prioritizes certain factors over others.

1. Legal or regulatory frameworks

Unsurprisingly, the existence of a legal or regulatory regime conferring monopoly on a single enterprise is the single most determinative factor of dominance. This is evident in the CCI’s approach in cases involving a public sector enterprise or public utility. For instance, in Faridabad Industries Association, the CCI noted that Adani Gas was the sole authorised city-gas distributor.¹⁵ In several cases against Coal India, the CCI considered the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act 1973, which granted Coal India and its subsidiaries a legal monopoly.¹⁶

The CCI has adopted a similar approach in multiple cases relating to restrictions imposed by sports federations, such as the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI),¹⁷ Hockey India,¹⁸ the All India Chess Federation¹⁹ and most recently, its initiation of an inquiry into the Basketball Federation of India.²⁰ Here, the CCI notes the impact of regulatory power vested in each sports federation – each sports federation is the “de facto” regulatory authority for the conduct of its sport at the national level, and this power extends to their ability to control or restrict private professional leagues within each sport.

2. Market shares are indicative but not determinative

Market share is another key factor. However, as noted above, it operates as a threshold filter, and is not always determinative of dominance by itself. Absent a legal monopoly, the CCI looks first to market share, and a low market share usually defeats the allegation of dominance.²¹ The CCI repeatedly stresses that share is not the sole determinant, and it has never found dominance in share alone.²² One of the clearest illustrations of this principle is in MCX-SX v. NSE,²³ where three players held roughly equal shares (MCX 34%, NSE 30%, USE 36%). Nevertheless, the CCI found NSE (which had the lowest market share) to be dominant, based on other factors, such as its “historical legacy,” financial strength and ability to sustain a zero-price policy “long enough to outlive competition.” A related and crucial determinant of dominance is the position of the dominant player relative to its nearest competitor or other market players. In Pankaj Gas Cylinders,²⁴ the CCI highlighted that the DG had not come to a finding of dominance based merely on IOCL’s market share, but the fact that it was “way ahead of its competitors” in terms of infrastructure, distribution and sales in the market for the supply of LPG cylinders.

Market shares are inherently static, capturing the level of competition for a particular time frame, based on historical sales data. One of the key critiques of over-reliance on market shares is that it does not account for dynamic competition, or the impact of potential competition, particularly in digital markets. As such, the CCI often notes the durability of market positions and sustained market-leading positions to support its finding of dominance.

• For instance, in Intel,²⁵ the CCI considered the market shares of Intel and its nearest competitor, AMD over a period of 5 years, noting that Intel had consistently remained the market leader. Even where its market share declined in a particular year, it outstripped AMD in terms of sales value and volume.

• In contrast, in Fast Track Call Cabs,²⁶ the CCI noted that the market shares of Uber and Ola were dynamic and fluctuated throughout the period of investigation, supporting the conclusion that neither player was dominant.

3. Other factors and their relative importance

While the CCI has never come to a finding of dominance entirely on account of high customer dependence on the enterprise or the lack of countervailing buyer power, evidence supporting these aspects has weighed heavily in favour of a dominance finding.

• For instance, in BCCI,²⁷ the CCI highlighted that the success of private professional cricket leagues depended heavily on access to players and venues to conduct cricket matches. The BCCI, being the de facto regulator of cricket in India, controlled access to these key inputs, since it had the power to prohibit players from playing in “unsanctioned” events, among other things.

• Similarly, in East India Petroleum,²⁸ the absolute dependence of oil manufacturing companies on South Asia LPG Company, on account of its effective monopoly in offering the full range of terminalling services at the Vishakhapatnam port and the range of its infrastructure and resources, was key to the CCI’s assessment of dominance.

The CCI frequently treats its evaluation of “entry barriers” as a catch-all category, considering aspects such as technical capabilities (patents, highly specialised goods, network effects, requirement of upfront investments in R&D) and the high cost of entry (requirement of expensive infrastructure, licensing requirements, economies of scale) coupled with high market share as being determinative of dominance. This aspect is key to the CCI’s assessment of dominance in digital markets, particularly in considering the impact of access to user data in Google Search,²⁹ Google Android³⁰ and the WhatsApp Privacy Policy³¹ case.

CCI decisions also cite economic size and resources, including those of group companies and vertical integration, as factors supporting a finding of dominance.

• For instance, in Kapoor Glass v. Schott Glass,³² the CCI noted that Schott Glass India and Scott-Kaisha, its pharmaceutical tubing joint venture in India, was a part of the Schott Group. It noted that Schott Group is a multinational corporation headquartered in Germany and has been engaged in the manufacture of speciality materials for more than 125 years; it has six production sites all over the world; and that the Schott Group companies were among the leading global manufacturers of glass tubing and pharmaceutical packaging.

• Similarly, the CCI considered the fact that Grasim Industries Limited was part of the Aditya Birla group of companies that had a significant presence downstream from the manufacture of viscose staple fibre in its dominance assessment.³³

Notably, CCI cases almost never consider “social obligations/costs” under Section 19(4)(k) and “relative advantage/economic development” under Section 19(4)(l).

4. Evolution of dominance in digital markets cases

The CCI’s ability to evaluate dominance in digital markets through a statutory lens crafted in 2002, offers compelling proof of the Act’s enduring flexibility and sector-agnostic nature. The CCI highlights the structural features of digital markets (such as network effects, lock-in, data advantages) to conclude that dominance is entrenched and self-sustaining. As with its approach in traditional markets, the empirical evidence supporting these conclusions is not always robust.

The CCI typically relies on entry barriers, consumer dependence and “any other relevant factor” under Section 19(4)(m), to assess market power peculiar to data-driven, multi-sided platforms. The following trends emerge from the CCI’s enforcement practice thus far.

• Network effects as a self-reinforcing entry barrier. In multi-sided markets, each additional user raises the platform’s value to users on the other side, allowing platform owners to scale rapidly and sustainably. In Google Search, the CCI treated strong network effects as an entry barrier that insulates an incumbent’s share: “given barriers to entry and Google’s scale advantage, it is unlikely that a large number of users would switch… Google’s market shares have been consistently high, which suggests that it has other advantages, besides technical advantages, which insulate its market position.”³⁴ Network effects convert a high market share from a snapshot into a durable structural feature. This was mirrored in Google Android³⁵ and WhatsApp Privacy Policy³⁶ as well.

• Multi-homing as a potential counter-indicator. Multi-homing refers to the ability of end users to use rival platforms simultaneously, with minimal or no switching costs. In some cases, the CCI found that multi-homing ensured that network effects did not foreclose competition and the absence of dominance.

  • In Fast Track Call Cab, the CCI declined to find Ola dominant because riders and drivers “multi-home” — “once these apps are installed on a device, riders can switch from one app to another in no-time.” It stressed that Section 19(4) emphasises “the size and importance of the competitors, rather than the market shares of competitors,” and that “the market certainly has not tipped.”³⁷

  • The CCI’s approach to the impact of multi-homing in instant messaging, however, has shifted considerably. In earlier cases, the CCI considered the ability of end users to multi-home between various messaging apps sufficient to dismiss allegations of abuse of dominance against WhatsApp.³⁸ However, in the WhatsApp Privacy Policy decision in 2024,³⁹ the CCI held the exact opposite – i.e. that network effects trumped multi-homing behaviour. Even if end-users install multiple messaging apps, because most of a user’s social and professional circles remained on WhatsApp, the ability to use other apps did not provide a meaningful competitive constraint or a viable alternative for users to switch entirely.

• Default or status-quo bias as a source and entrenchment of dominance. In Google Android,⁴⁰ upheld in substance by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT”),⁴¹ the CCI found that the default configuration of a device entrenches dominance because users overwhelmingly stay with pre-set options. Through its contractual arrangements with mobile manufacturers, Google secured mandatory pre-installation of its core app suite at prominent positions, including as the default option. The NCLAT recorded that these clauses “operate as behavioural bias in the form of status quo bias,” and did not accept Google’s argument that the finding was unsubstantiated.⁴²

• Data advantages. The CCI has increasingly treated accumulated user data and the ability to generate economies of scale as a strong entry barrier in platform markets. It highlights the advantages of the data feedback loop in reinforcing network effects, which a new entrant would find difficult to replicate. This is most clearly articulated in Google Search.⁴³ The CCI emphasised the self-reinforcing nature of data accumulation in online intermediation, including in the MMT-OYO case.⁴⁴ Here, the CCI noted that platforms derive value from revealed consumer search preferences, which can be monetized through targeted advertisements, even if the end user does not actually complete the transaction on the platform. In WhatsApp Privacy Policy,⁴⁵ the CCI analysed data-sharing across an integrated platform group as a dimension of platform power. The CCI’s market study of competition issues in the artificial intelligence (AI) sector notes the difficulty of accessing large volumes of high-quality data and the advantage of tech incumbents as being key entry barriers for Indian AI startups.⁴⁶

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1. The CCI has adopted this approach to close proceedings in sectors where there is reliable and easily accessible information in the public domain on market structure, market players and their market shares. These include financial services - Om Prakash v. Media Video Ltd & LIC Housing Finance, Case no. 57 of 2014, M/s Dhanvir Food Product v. Bank of Baroda, Case no 21 of 2015 and Jaideep Ugrankar v. Client Associates, Case no 8 of 2018; automotives - Samaleshwari Automobiles v. Tata Motors, Case no. 44 of 2021, Manav Seva Dham v. Maruti Suzuki, Case no. 3 of 2022 and Harmit Ahuja v. Maruti Suzuki, Case no 43 of 2023; real estate - Kirat Singh v. Orchid Infrastructure Developers, Case no 51 of 2014; Dalip Singh Arshi v. Aerens Jai Reality, Case no. 11 of 2014, Yashpal Raghubir Mertia v. Aura Real Estate, Case no 14 of 2016.↩︎

2. Relevant market is defined in sections 2(r), 2(s) and 2(t) of the Act. Section 19(6) lists factors relevant to analysing the geographic market, while section 19(7) lists product-market factors.↩︎

3. Shamsher Kataria v Honda Siel Cars India Ltd, Case No 03 of 2011.↩︎

4. In Shamsher Kataria, the CCI did not penalize Premier as there was no evidence of customers being denied access to spare parts over the counter or aftersales services by independent repairers. This was because Premier had recently commenced sales and its cars were all under warranty during the investigation. Nevertheless, the CCI still found that Premier was dominant in the aftermarket for its spare parts and aftersales services.↩︎

5. Vivek Sharma v Max Super Speciality Hospital, Case No 77(1–12) of 2015.↩︎

6. Ibid.↩︎

7. Such as the European Union, the United Kingdom and Singapore.↩︎

8. Consumer Online Foundation v Tata Sky Ltd, Case No 02 of 2009.↩︎

9. Fast Track Call Cab Pvt Ltd v ANI Technologies Pvt Ltd, Case Nos 06 and 74 of 2015.↩︎

10. Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Report of the Competition Law Review Committee, July 2019.↩︎

11. HT Media Ltd v Super Cassettes Industries Ltd, Case No 40 of 2011.↩︎

12. Section 19(4)(a) – (m) of the Act.↩︎

13. Interestingly, the CCI can also reject factors outside this list that are inapplicable or not borne out by evidence. For instance, in Ajay Devgn Films v. Yash Raj Films and Ors., Case No 66 of 2012, the CCI noted that a bare claim based on popularity and name recognition is not sufficient to satisfy the standard for dominant position under the Act, and dismissed the case.↩︎

14. Belaire v. DLF, Case no. 19 of 2010 (Belaire).↩︎

15. Faridabad Industries Association v Adani Gas Ltd. Case No 71 of 2012.↩︎

16. Maharashtra State Power Generation Co Ltd v Coal India Ltd, Case No 11 of 2012 (and connected cases); affirmed in Coal India Ltd v Competition Commission of India 2023 SCC OnLine SC 740.↩︎

17. Surinder Singh Barmi v Board of Control for Cricket in India, Case No 61 of 2010 (8 February 2013) (BCCI)↩︎

18. Dhanraj Pillay and Ors. v. Hockey India, Case No.73 of 2011.↩︎

19. Hemant Sharma v All India Chess Federation, Case No 79 of 2011.↩︎

20. Elite Pro Basketball Private Limited v. Basketball Federation of India, Case no. 10 of 2024.↩︎

21. For instance, in JAK Communications Pvt Ltd v Sun Direct TV Pvt Ltd, Case No 08 of 2009, Sun Direct’s market share of approximately 18% negated a finding of dominance. Similarly, in Dhruv Suri v Mundra Port and Special Economic Zone Ltd, Case No 18 of 2009, the CCI categorically rejected dominance by highlighting Mundra Port’s “abysmal market share of 5%”.↩︎

22. Pankaj Gas Cylinders v Indian Oil Corporation Ltd, Case No 33 of 2011 (Pankaj Gas Cylinders).↩︎

23. MCX Stock Exchange Ltd v National Stock Exchange of India Ltd, Case No 13 of 2009. Two dissenting orders (Members Geeta Gouri and Anurag Goel), rejected the finding of dominance precisely because market shares and resources of the three players were relatively comparable.↩︎

24. Pankaj Gas Cylinders.↩︎

25. Matrix Info Systems Private Limited v. Intel Corporation, Case no. 5 of 2019.↩︎

26. M/s Fast Track Call Cab Private Ltd. v. M/s ANI Technologies Pvt. Ltd., Case No. 06 of 2015.↩︎

27. BCCI.↩︎

28. East India Petroleum Pvt. Ltd. v. South Asia LPG Company, Case No. 76 of 2011. (East India Petroleum)↩︎

29. Matrimony.com Limited v. Google LLC and Ors., Case No. 07 and 30 of 2012.↩︎

30. Mr Umar Javeed and others v. Google LLC and Anr, Case no. 39 of 2018.↩︎

31. In re: Updated Terms of Service and Privacy Policy for WhatsApp Users, Suo Motu Case no. 01 of 2021, with Case no. 05 of 2021 and Case no. 30 of 2021.↩︎

32. Kapoor Glass Private Limited v. Schott Glass India Private Limited, Case No. 22 of 2010. (Kapoor Glass). Although the CCI’s decision in Kapoor Glass was ultimately set aside by the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court concurred with the CCI’s finding that Schott Glass was dominant.↩︎

33. XYZ v. Association of Man-Made Fibre Industry of India and Ors, Case No. 62 of 2016.↩︎

34. Matrimony.com Ltd v Google LLC, Case Nos 07 and 30 of 2012.↩︎

35. Mr Umar Javeed and others v. Google LLC and Anr, Case no. 39 of 2018.↩︎

36. In re: Updated Terms of Service and Privacy Policy for WhatsApp Users, Suo Motu Case no. 01 of 2021, with Case no. 05 of 2021 and Case no. 30 of 2021.↩︎

37. Fast Track Call Cab Pvt Ltd v ANI Technologies Pvt Ltd, Case Nos 06 and 74 of 2015.↩︎

38. Shri Vinod Kumar Gupta, Chartered Accountant v. WhatsApp Inc., Case No. 99 of 2016.↩︎

39. WhatsApp Privacy Policy. This was affirmed by the NCLAT in appeal, which held that multi-homing does not indicate real substitutability since user dependence and engagement remain centred on WhatsApp.↩︎

40. Umar Javeed v Google LLC CCI Case No 39 of 2018 (20 October 2022).↩︎

41. Google LLC v Competition Commission of India Competition Appeal (AT) No 01 of 2023 (NCLAT, 29 March 2023).↩︎

42. Google LLC v Competition Commission of India Competition Appeal (AT) No 01 of 2023 (NCLAT, 29 March 2023)↩︎

43. Matrimony.com Ltd v Google LLC, Case Nos 07 and 30 of 2012.↩︎

44. Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Associations of India v. MakeMyTrip and OYO, Case nos. 14 of 2019 and 01 of 2020.↩︎

45. In re Updated Terms of Service and Privacy Policy for WhatsApp Users CCI Suo Motu Case No 01 of 2021; on appeal WhatsApp LLC v Competition Commission of India (NCLAT, 2025).↩︎

46. CCI, Market Study on Artificial Intelligence and Competition (2025).↩︎